會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量在投資中的決策作用對(duì)私人信息和監(jiān)測(cè)的影響_外文翻譯


簡(jiǎn)介
　　　
管理者與外部資本的供應(yīng)商信息是不對(duì)稱的在這種情況下企業(yè)是如何影響金融資本的投資的呢？越來(lái)越多的證據(jù)表明，會(huì)計(jì)質(zhì)量越好，越可以減少信息的不對(duì)稱和對(duì)融資成本的約束。與此相一致的可能性是，減少了具有更高敏感性的會(huì)計(jì)質(zhì)量的公司的投資對(duì)內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流量。威爾第和希拉里發(fā)現(xiàn)，對(duì)企業(yè)投資和與投資相關(guān)的會(huì)計(jì)質(zhì)量容易不足，是容易引發(fā)過(guò)度投資的原因。
　　　
當(dāng)投資效率低下時(shí)，會(huì)計(jì)的質(zhì)量重要性可以減輕外部資本的影響，供應(yīng)商有可能獲得私人信息或可直接監(jiān)測(cè)管理人員。通過(guò)訪問(wèn)個(gè)人信息與控制管理行為，外部資本的供應(yīng)商可以直接影響企業(yè)的投資，降低了會(huì)計(jì)質(zhì)量的重要性。符合這個(gè)想法的還有比德爾和希拉里的比較會(huì)計(jì)對(duì)不同國(guó)家的投資質(zhì)量效益的影響。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，會(huì)計(jì)品質(zhì)的影響在于美國(guó)投資效益，而不是在日本。他們認(rèn)為，一個(gè)可能的解釋是不同的是債務(wù)和股權(quán)的美國(guó)版本的資本結(jié)構(gòu)混合了SUS的日本企業(yè)。
　　　
我們研究如何通過(guò)會(huì)計(jì)質(zhì)量靈敏度的重要性來(lái)延長(zhǎng)不同資金來(lái)源對(duì)企業(yè)的投資現(xiàn)金流量的不同影響。直接測(cè)試如何影響不同的融資來(lái)源會(huì)計(jì)，通過(guò)最近獲得了債務(wù)融資的公司來(lái)投資敏感性現(xiàn)金流的質(zhì)量的效果，債務(wù)融資的比較說(shuō)明了對(duì)那些不能夠通過(guò)他們的能力獲得融資的沒(méi)有影響。為了緩解這一問(wèn)題，我們限制我們的樣本公司有所有最近獲得的債務(wù)融資和利用訪問(wèn)的差異信息和監(jiān)測(cè)通過(guò)公共私人債務(wù)獲得連續(xù)貸款的建議。我們承認(rèn)，投資內(nèi)部現(xiàn)金流敏感性可能較低獲得債務(wù)融資的可能性。然而，這種可能性偏見拒絕了我們的假設(shè)。


Introduction
　　
Information asymmetry between managers and outside capital suppliers can affect how firms finance capital investments. A growing body of evidence indicates that better accounting quality can reduce information asymmetry costs and reduce financing constraints. Consistent with this possibility, Bid- dle and Hilary (2006) document that higher accounting quality reduces the sensitivity of firms’ investment to their internally generated cash flows. Verdi (2006) and Biddle, Hillary, and Verdi (2009) find that accounting quality is positively correlated with investment for firms prone to under- invest and is negatively correlated with investment for firms prone tooverinvest.
　　　
The importance of accounting quality on investment inefficiency may be mitigated when outside capital suppliers have private information or can directly monitor managers. By accessing private information and controlling managerial actions, outside capital suppliers can directly affect a firm’s investments, reducing the importance of accounting quality. Consistent with this idea, Biddle and Hilary (2006) compare the influence of accounting quality on investment efficiency across countries. They find that accounting quality influences investment efficiency in the United States, but not in Japan. They suggest that one potential explanation for this cross-country difference is the mix of debt and equity in the capital structures of U.S. ver-sus Japanese firms.
　　　
We extend this research by examining how different sources of financing affect the importance of accounting quality on firms’ investment–cash flow sensitivity. Directly testing how different sources of financing influence the effect of accounting quality on the investment–cash flow sensitivity is chal-lenging because a comparison of firms that recently obtained debt financing to those that did not could be affected by their ability to obtain financing.To alleviate this problem, we restrict our sample to firms that have all recently obtained debt financing and exploit the differences in access to pri-vate information and monitoring that exist across the public debt to private lending continuum as suggested by Diamond 1991.1 We acknowledge that the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows may be lower immedi-ately after obtaining debt financing. However, this possibility would bias against rejecting our hypotheses.
　　　Specifically, we identify a sample of 1,163 firms on the Securities Data-corp (SDC) database that have recently raised capital through the issuance of either public debt or syndicated bank debt. We restrict our sample to firms that have recently obtained debt financing to hold constant the firm characteristics associated with borrowing. However, within the sample of firms that have recently obtained debt financing, there are likely to be sig-nificant differences in the capital provider’s access to private information and the constraints they place on managerial actions. Diamond’s (1991) theory implies that public debt holders have less access to private information and are thus less effective in monitoring bor-rowers than banks. Based on these arguments, we predict that accounting quality should have a larger influence on firms’ investment–cash flow sensi-tivity for firms with public debt than for those with bank debt. Second, we expec..